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BEPS, tax sovereignty and global justice
Laurens van Apeldoorn*
University College and the Institute of Philosophy, Leiden University, Leiden, The
Netherlands
The base erosion and proﬁt shifting (BEPS) initiative of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and G20 countries
marks an important development in the reform of the international taxation
regime. In this paper I argue that the initiative nevertheless fails to provide
a coherent account of what global justice requires in the realm of ﬁscal
policy. While the OECD’s ostensible aim to increase and protect the tax
sovereignty of states is commendable, there is insufﬁcient attention for the
distribution of relative tax sovereignty. I show that current global income
inequality is correlated with signiﬁcant inequality of tax sovereignty, that
this inequality is unjust on a plausible conception of what global justice
requires, and that the BEPS initiative is unlikely to meaningfully address
this injustice. I close by suggesting that an internationalist conception of
justice concerned with securing the tax sovereignty of independent polities
may need to prescribe the creation of globally redistributive institutions.
Keywords: international taxation; global justice; ﬁscal self-determination;
sovereignty; internationalism
The base erosion and proﬁt shifting (BEPS) initiative of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and G20 countries marks an
important development in the reform of the international taxation regime (see
OECD 2013a, 2015 for overviews.). The plan, which has been adopted in the last
months of 2015 and now awaits implementation, is designed to close tax avoid-
ance loopholes in the patchwork of domestic ﬁscal laws and bilateral tax treaties,
and to correct the corrosive impact of tax competition. Aggressive tax avoidance
by wealthy individuals and multinational corporations (MNCs) facilitated by
states competing for foreign direct investment (FDI) and mobile capital, the
OECD warned in the 1998 report ‘Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging
Global Issue’ that ﬁrst put the issue prominently on the political agenda, may
affect states’ ﬁscal sovereignty. It may ‘erode national tax bases’, ‘alter the struc-
ture of taxation’ and ‘hamper the application of progressive tax rates and the
achievement of redistributive goals’ (OECD 1998, p. 14). The OECD estimates
conservatively that 4–10% of global corporate income tax revenue (100–240
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billion USD annually) is lost to BEPS (OECD 2015, p. 4). An important aim of
the BEPS project is accordingly ‘to provide governments with more efﬁcient
tools to ensure the effectiveness of their sovereign tax policies’ (OECD 2015,
p. 4, cf. OECD 2013b, p. 47) with other apparent aims being the correction of
‘distortions’ in trade and investment patterns, and securing a level playing ﬁeld
between MNCs and domestic companies (OECD 1998, p. 14). The proposed
measures are broadly informed by the principle of economic allegiance that
requires that individuals and corporations pay taxes where they conduct their eco-
nomic activities (OECD 2013b, p. 8, 2015, p. 4). Actions to that effect include
the harmonisation of domestic legislation to prevent so-called hybrid mismatches
(asymmetries in the treatment of ﬁnancial instruments that may lead to the double
non-taxation), additional safeguards in tax treaties to prevent proﬁt shifting by
means of transfer mispricing (manipulating the prices in transactions between
subsidiaries of a MNC), and more robust transparency requirements in the form
of automatic information exchange.
The dominant ‘internationalist’ position in the philosophical literature on
international taxation (perhaps surprisingly) follows the assessment of the
OECD in a number of important respects (e.g. Rixen 2011, Dietsch and Rixen
2014a, 2014b, Ronzoni 2014). In Catching Capital: The Ethics of Tax Compe-
tition (2015), the most detailed and carefully developed version of this posi-
tion, Peter Dietsch condemns the current situation as unjust because it limits
states’ ﬁscal self-determination, that is, their effective sovereignty in ﬁscal
affairs.1 Effective (or de facto) sovereignty is here conceived as the ability to
achieve policy goals by means of legislation and is distinguished from formal
(or de jure) sovereignty consisting in the right to write and enforce law
(Dietsch 2011b, p. 2109). Dietsch outlines how global justice can be thought
to require that the international taxation regime is reformed to improve and
protect the effective ﬁscal sovereignty of states. He terms this a requirement of
‘international background justice’, building on an internationalist conception of
justice that demands that states are provided the capacity to effectively ensure
domestic distributive justice. (Rawls 1999, Ronzoni 2009) Although, as will
become clear below, Dietsch is critical of various aspects of the BEPS project,
he agrees with the OECD that the primary goal of institutional reform should
be the protection of ﬁscal self-determination. He also agrees with the OECD
that this aim may be secured in part by means of the implementation of the
principle of economic allegiance (which he terms the ‘membership principle’):
we can restore ﬁscal self-determination by (among other things) ensuring that
individuals and corporations pay taxes there where they employ economic
activities (Dietsch 2015, pp. 82, 83).
In this paper I take Dietsch’s analysis as my point of departure in order to
highlight a fundamental tension in the OECD’s BEPS initiative. I argue that
the principle of economic allegiance is not, as the OECD has it, a reliable
means to protecting effective ﬁscal sovereignty, at least insofar as this can be
reasonably understood to be a requirement of justice (that demands equal ﬁscal
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self-determination or the universal satisfaction of a baseline of sufﬁcient ﬁscal
self-determination). The distribution of ﬁscal self-determination between states
is an important facet of international background justice, but the principle of
economic allegiance is insensitive to the distribution of ﬁscal self-determination
(Section 5). This means that implementing the principle of economic allegiance
does not reliably increase, let alone guarantee, a just distribution of ﬁscal self-
determination. This is especially worrying given current global income inequal-
ity, which is correlated with signiﬁcant inequality in ﬁscal self-determination
(Section 4).
This observation leads me to a second broader point about the nascent liter-
ature on global tax justice (Section 6). I argue that the dominant internationalist
position, that demands targeted regulation of the actions of states but generally
stops short of proposing explicitly redistributive institutions at an international
level, must take the possible need for continuous international redistribution
more seriously. This suggests that there is room for fostering a greater consen-
sus between internationalists and cosmopolitans, traditionally more committed
to international redistribution, on appropriate institutional reform in this area.
Before I outline these arguments in greater detail, I start by explaining the
overlap (Sections 1 and 2) and differences (Section 3) between the OECD’s
BEPS initiative and Dietsch’s alternative proposal to curb tax competition and
to catch mobile capital in the net of domestic tax authorities.
1. Tax sovereignty and global justice
According to the OECD one important reason to worry about tax competition
is that it ‘poses a threat in terms of tax sovereignty and of tax revenue’ (OECD
2013b, p. 47). More speciﬁcally, it may hamper the ability to raise sufﬁcient
revenue and secure the redistributive goals desired by the countries’ population
(OECD 1998, p. 14). This is in large part attributable to aggressive tax plan-
ning by MNCs facilitated by states attempting to increase their taxable base by
attracting the accounting proﬁts of MNCs and FDI (OECD 2015, p. 4, cf.
Dietsch 2015, pp. 46–54 for an overview). States engage in the former kind of
tax competition (sometimes called ‘virtual’ tax competition) when they use ﬁs-
cal policies to attract the proﬁts from economic activities that MNCs have gen-
erated elsewhere, whereas they engage in the latter (‘real’ tax competition)
when they use ﬁscal policies to attract actual investment for production or
other economic activities (Dietsch 2015, pp. 87, 88, 2016, pp. 232–236). In
the face of such competition, which has become endemic with the liberalisation
of trade and abolition of capital controls in the last decades of the previous
century, states have where possible tended to reduce corporation and capital
gains taxes. While high-income states have by and large been able to protect
their revenue ﬂows by shifting the tax burden to relatively immobile economic
factors such as labour, income and consumption (with predominantly regressive
effects), low-income states have, for reasons that will be elaborated on below,
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generally been unable to offset the decrease in corporate income tax revenue
(Avi-Yonah 2000, Dietsch 2011a). This revenue loss is estimated by some to
be greater than the combined foreign aid budgets of high-income states
(Christian Aid 2008).
Accordingly, one important aim of the BEPS project is to support ‘the
effective ﬁscal sovereignty of countries over the design of their tax systems’
(OECD 2014, p. 14). This aim is shared by the dominant approach in the
philosophical literature on justice in the realm of international taxation. Peter
Dietsch shows that the importance of protecting ﬁscal self-determination can
be understood as a requirement of international background justice, an interna-
tionalist account of global justice ﬁrst proposed by Ronzoni (2009). Problems
of background justice may arise in contexts where engaging in a practice has a
tendency to undermine that practice if it remains unregulated by appropriate
background institutions (Ronzoni 2009, p. 251). For instance, initially volun-
tary exchanges between individuals may give rise to distributions that severely
restrict the range of options available to some of the individuals, thus rendering
their subsequent exchanges involuntary. In the international context background
justice can be thought to require background institutions that ensure that states
are and remain substantively or ‘effectively’ sovereign. On this account, we
are, in the words of Ronzoni, ‘not interested in outcomes; we do not require
states to be equally afﬂuent … We are instead interested in effective sover-
eignty as a set of conditions under which independent sovereign states can
interact justly’ (Ronzoni 2009, p. 248, cf. Ronzoni 2012, p. 585). Global jus-
tice, then, does not require the global distribution of individual advantages to
conform to some principle of distributive justice, but rather that all states have
the capacity to secure a just distribution of advantages between their citizens.
States must, therefore, have the capacity to design their legal and economic
institutions in such a way that they reﬂect the conception of domestic distribu-
tive justice of their citizens. In the realm of ﬁscal policy Dietsch takes this to
require the ability to determine the size of the government budget and the level
of redistribution (Dietsch 2015, p. 35).2
Dietsch says little about how we should operationalise these aspects of
ﬁscal self-determination and I therefore suggest to further specify the concept
as follows. Since both these abilities plausibly come in degrees it is useful to
conceive this capacity in terms of opportunity sets: the amount of ﬁscal self-
determination a state possesses is dependent on the cardinality of the set of
effectively available options with regard to the size of the budget and the
extent of redistribution: the greater the set, the greater a states’ ﬁscal self-
determination.3 This allows for a further speciﬁcation of the two components
of ﬁscal self-determination.
First, since the ‘size of the budget’ is a function of the ﬁscal institutions of
a state one may operationalise it in terms of the tax revenue or ‘tax take’4 as
share of the total economy (GDP). This means that the ﬁrst component of ﬁs-
cal self-determination is expressed in terms of the opportunity set of levels of
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tax revenue as percentage of GDP. States have greater ﬁscal self-determination
if they have a larger range of tax-revenue-to-GDP ratios to select from. Sec-
ondly, the ‘extent of redistribution’ may be operationalised in terms of the
extent of the difference between wealth inequality before and after taxation
and spending (where inequality is measured in terms of the Gini coefﬁcient).
This is admittedly only a rough approximation of what matters in redistributive
policies, since inequality as such masks potentially relevant differences
between individuals that may or may not be the appropriate object of redis-
tributive measures. It is, however, difﬁcult to provide a more precise opera-
tionalisation that allows for international comparisons. On this account the
second component of ﬁscal self-determination is expressed in the opportunity
set of percentage points of decrease (and, theoretically, increase) in Gini coefﬁ-
cient before and after taxation and government spending.
Fiscal self-determination, so understood, is necessary for a state to be able
to be responsive to the beliefs of its citizens about what justice requires. Since
tax competition erodes ﬁscal self-determination and thereby the state’s capacity
to shape its institutions in accordance with the conception of justice preferred
by its citizens, it forms a case of international background injustice.
2. The principle of economic allegiance
How do we secure ﬁscal self-determination? The OECD suggests by means of
the implementation of the principle of economic allegiance. First proposed in
1923 in a report on the then emerging problem of double taxation submitted to
the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, the principle prescribes that
the jurisdiction to tax should be distributed in accordance with where ‘the true
economic interests of the individual are found’ (League of Nations 1923,
p. 20). Individuals have economic interests where they acquire, locate, or con-
sume wealth, or in short, where they conduct economic activities. The principle
is reﬂected in the BEPS project, which aims to ‘better align rights to tax with
economic activity’ (OECD 2013b, p. 11, cf. OECD 2013a, p. 18) by ensuring
that corporations do not shift accounting proﬁts to low tax jurisdictions and so
artiﬁcially separate the proﬁt from the economic activities that generated it.
In the literature there is broad agreement that the normative justiﬁcation
underlying the principle of economic allegiance is that persons having
economic interests in a country are rightfully liable to taxation because of the
beneﬁts they derive from the state’s provision of public goods and services. As
one commentator puts it succinctly, ‘[t]he principle of economic allegiance
requires anyone that obtains signiﬁcant beneﬁts from an economic community
to pay tax to that community’. (Pinto 2003, p. 196). In the public ﬁnance liter-
ature an appeal to the beneﬁt of taxpayers is typical in a domestic context in
order to quantify their tax liability, the argument being that taxes should be
proportionate to the beneﬁt individuals receive from government spending.5 In
the present context the beneﬁt principle is rather used to justify and allocate
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tax jurisdiction in the ﬁrst place (something that can be taken for granted in
the domestic context) (Hinnekens 1998, p. 196, Kaufman 1998, p. 198). How
the state, given its jurisdictional authority, subsequently quantiﬁes the appropri-
ate size of the tax is a separate and further question.6
Dietsch also embraces the principle of economic allegiance, although he
terms it the ‘membership principle’ (because it determines in which country or
countries an individual or corporation is liable to taxation and thus a ‘mem-
ber’). The membership principle states that ‘individuals and companies should
be viewed as members [and pay tax] in those countries where they beneﬁt
from the public services and infrastructure’ (Dietsch 2015, pp. 82, 83). Since
corporations beneﬁt from public goods and services where they conduct eco-
nomic activity, he equally reaches the conclusion that tax jurisdiction should
depend on the location of economic activity.7 Dietsch thus agrees with the
OECD both that institutional reform should be aimed at the protection of ﬁscal
self-determination and that the principle of economic allegiance is a useful
means to that end. The question is whether this is true.
3. Tax competition for FDI and the ﬁscal policy restraint
The principle of economic allegiance rules out virtual tax competition, the
competition for accounting proﬁts that may lead to proﬁt shifting. When effec-
tively implemented, MNCs are prevented from conducting economic activities,
such as production or research and development, in a high tax country while
shifting the proﬁts to low or zero-tax jurisdictions or ‘tax havens’. The princi-
ple of economic allegiance proscribes such behaviour. In accordance with the
principle, the tax base (say, corporate proﬁts) must be allocated to the countries
where the economic activities generating the proﬁts take place. This should
make it possible for states, in principle, to tax the corporate proﬁts that were
previously relocated abroad.
It does, however, not prevent real tax competition in order to attract FDI.
Recall that the principle of economic allegiance only allocates the tax base,
and leaves the appropriate level of tax rates up to the determination of sover-
eign legislatures. The tax burden is one of many factors that determine the
attractiveness of the investment climate and this competition could for this rea-
son be thought to be less severe than that for accounting proﬁts (Rixen 2011,
p. 460). However, insofar as states want to attract FDI, for instance in order to
increase the taxable base, promote economic growth, or attract the technical
know-how that often accompanies investments by MNCs, they continue to
have an interest in reducing tax rates on the mobile tax base that is allocated
to them by the principle of economic allegiance, and to shift the tax burden to
immobile economic factors such as labour and consumption (Keen and
Marchand, 1997, Oats 1999, pp. 1125, 1126). Indeed, the OECD suggests that
this kind of competition should not be considered harmful, noting that ‘no or
low taxation is not per se a cause of concern, but it becomes so when it is
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associated with practices that artiﬁcially segregate taxable income from the
activities that generate it’ (OECD 2013a, p. 10). In other words, the BEPS ini-
tiative is not designed to protect states from the threat to ﬁscal self-determina-
tion that may result from tax competition for FDI. (Devereux and Vella 2014,
p. 469 note this as a structural weakness of the OECD’s BEPS initiative.) Real
tax competition can accordingly be expected to continue to limit states’ ability
to determine the size of the budget and to engage in redistribution, and we
must conclude that the BEPS initiative inadequately protects the ﬁscal self-
determination of states that is ostensibly one of its chief aims. That aim
requires also at least the regulation of the tax rates that states set for the tax
base allocated to them by the principle of economic allegiance.
Dietsch’s introduction of a second principle – the ﬁscal policy constraint –
may be understood as an attempt to address this problem, though Dietsch fails
to call attention to this. His explicit objections to the OECD’s BEPS initiative
are limited to two practical concerns. First, the BEPS measures are primarily
intended to correct loopholes in the current system of separate accounting in
which the subsidiaries of MNCs are treated as separate companies, and compa-
nies belonging to the same unit must trade with one another as if they were
unrelated parties (the ‘arm’s length principle’). However, since for many such
transfers no comparable market transactions exist that would allow for an accu-
rate price determination, MNCs will likely continue to be able to manipulate
the system for tax purposes (Avi-Yonah 1995). Moreover, many proﬁt shifting
strategies are possible because of the complexity and artiﬁcial character of sep-
arate entity accounting. This suggests in the ‘cat-and-mouse game’ between
government regulators and the tax advisors of MNCs, in which the former try
to close the loopholes that the latter exploit, the former will ultimately lose
(Dietsch 2015, p. 115). Dietsch therefore joins a number of commentators in
calling to replace separate accounting with a system based on unitary taxation
with formula apportionment (UT + FA) (Dietsch 2015, pp. 114, 115).8 MNCs
and their subsidiaries are then treated as a single entity, the total worldwide
proﬁt of which is apportioned as tax base to the countries in which the MNCs
operate in accordance with a formula that reﬂects the economic activity of each
country where the entity is active (such as property, sales or payroll) (Dietsch
2015, p. 107). Second, since the implementation by states of the OECD’s rec-
ommendations is ultimately voluntary, Dietsch worries that the BEPS initiative
will do little to resolve the competitive dynamic of the current system, which
may reveal itself in the form of lax implementation and ‘mock compliance’
(Dietsch 2015, p. 115). He therefore suggests that in order to ensure that no
countries will defect from such mutually beneﬁcial cooperation more robust
monitoring, dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms are necessary, for
instance in the form of an International Tax Organisation, modelled on the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) that has similar functions in the domain of
international trade (Dietsch 2015, p. 104, cf. Rixen 2016).
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It may then be worth emphasising that Dietsch’s introduction of the ﬁscal
policy constraint indicates a signiﬁcant normative departure from the
approach taken by the OECD. The ﬁscal policy constraint proscribes a tax
policy if it produces a collectively suboptimal outcome in the sense that ‘it
is both strategically motivated and has a negative impact on the aggregate
ﬁscal self-determination of other states’ (Dietsch 2015, p. 80). When fol-
lowed this principle rules out that countries lower their corporate income tax
rate in order to attract FDI from abroad (unless it does not reduce the aggre-
gate ﬁscal self-determination, for instance because the resulting factor move-
ments disproportionally increase the ﬁscal self-determination of the receiving
countries).9 In other words, the principle does not rule out ﬁscal policies that
lead to economic factor movements, and resultant tax competition that may
reduce aggregate ﬁscal self-determination, as long as they are pursued for
non-strategic reasons. Dietsch proposes to test this by considering the follow-
ing counterfactual: Would the ﬁscal policy under consideration still be pur-
sued if the beneﬁts of attracting capital from abroad did not exist? In this
way he aims to strike a balance between on the one hand protecting self-
determination in a context where any differences in public expenditure will
likely lead to competition, and on the other hand allowing countries tax pol-
icy discretion in order to implement their preferred conception of justice, the
aim for which ﬁscal self-determination is protected in the ﬁrst place. The
ﬁscal policy constraint then removes some of the pressure of real tax compe-
tition: it complements the principle of economic allegiance to ensure that
countries not only are allocated the tax base (by the principle of economic
allegiance) but also have the opportunity to tax it.
While this amendment to the normative structure of the BEPS initiative is
a welcome one, in what follows I will argue that it does not go far enough.
Even when complemented with the ﬁscal policy constraint, the principle of
economic allegiance does not secure ﬁscal self-determination in a way that can
be considered just according to two plausible interpretations of what interna-
tional background justice requires. The problem is that both principles are
insensitive to the distribution of ﬁscal self-determination between states and,
therefore do not reliably increase the ﬁscal self-determination of the states that
most need it. Let me ﬁrst illustrate the signiﬁcance of the distribution of ﬁscal
self-determination by showing that ﬁscal self-determination and national
income (GDP) are strongly correlated.
4. Fiscal self-determination and inequality
Recall that ﬁscal self-determination consists in the ability to determine the size
of the government budget and the extent of ﬁscal redistribution within a state.
In this section 1 show that both aspects of ﬁscal self-determination are highly
correlated with national income, starting with the former. Low-income coun-
tries have great difﬁculties raising taxes due to obstacles that are widespread
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and well documented (Bird and Zolt 2005, Moore 2013). They usually have
largely non-urbanised, agricultural economies and extensive informal sectors,
including labour markets, that are impossible to tax, or for which tax collection
costs are high (Schneider and Enste 2000). Further, their ability to raise taxes
is hampered by social and political factors, such as weak political institutions,
lack of transparency, and poor tax morale and consequent norm compliance
(Besley and Person 2014). This is reﬂected in their tax take as a percentage of
GDP. For low-income countries this is currently on average 13% of GDP,
whereas in high-income OECD countries the tax take is on average 35% of
GDP (Moore, 2013, p. 7, Besley and Person 2014, p. 102 show a correlation
between GDP per capita and share of taxes to GDP). This suggests a strong
positive correlation between national income and the ability to determine the
size of the government budget, the ﬁrst component of ﬁscal self-determination.
From the opportunity set of low-income countries are excluded the higher tax-
revenue-to-GDP ratios that are available to high-income countries. Thus,
whereas rich countries are able to choose within broad limits the size of their
government, poor countries have no choice but to rely on a small government,
relative to the size of their economy, that can offer only a limited set of
services.10
It is unsurprising then that the difﬁculties facing low-income countries in
raising revenue also affect their ability to pursue redistributive programmes,
the second component of ﬁscal self-determination. Governments can redis-
tribute either through the allocation of the tax burden or the allocation of gov-
ernment spending. Take the former ﬁrst. The same kind of reasons that hamper
the ability of low-income countries to tax effectively, prevent them from pro-
gressively allocating the tax burden. Progressive property and other wealth
taxes are difﬁcult to implement for political reasons (Ahmad and Stern 1989,
p. 1017, Moore 2013, p. 30); whereas progressive income and capital gains
taxes are relatively easy to avoid or evade (Bird and Zolt 2005, p. 933).
Instead, low-income countries must predominantly rely on indirect taxes such
as value-added or sales taxes, which generally have a regressive effect on
income equality (Ahmad and Stern 1989, p. 1021). In general, the literature
suggests that redistribution of income through progressively allocating the tax
burden in low-income countries has been mostly ineffective (see for a literature
review Chu et al. 2000, pp. 31, 34–38). For this reason commentators advise
that low-income countries turn to the spending side of the government budget
in order to achieve the desired redistribution (Tanzi 1998, p. 15, Bird and Zolt
2005, pp. 941–943).
Government spending may have distributional effects because it can pro-
vide direct or indirect beneﬁts that accrue disproportionally to the poor. Unfor-
tunately, low-income countries also have a poor track record effectively
targeting poverty and inequality through expenditure programmes. This is in
part due to corruption and ‘clientistic’ political institutions (Bird and Zolt
2005, p. 932) but more importantly because of the limited size of their tax
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base. Since low-income countries have, as noted, tax-revenue-per-GDP ratios
that are on average about one-third of that of high-income OECD countries, it
follows that they can engage in much less robust redistributive spending.
Accordingly, a positive correlation can be established between tax-revenue-
per-GDP and the decrease in inequality after direct taxes and transfers (Kohler
2015, p. 8). For instance, whereas countries in Western Africa in 2006
achieved on average a decrease in Gini coefﬁcient of about 2 points given a
tax-revenue-per-GDP of about 23%, countries in Western Europe achieved a
decrease in Gini coefﬁcient of about 14 points with a tax-revenue-per-GDP of
about 45% (Kohler 2015, p. 8). This, in turn, suggests a positive correlation
between national income and the ability to determine the extent of redistribu-
tion, the second component of ﬁscal self-determination: the higher decreases in
Gini coefﬁcient achievable by high-income countries by means of taxation and
government spending are unavailable in the opportunity set of low-income
countries. Since low-income countries have difﬁculties implementing progres-
sive tax systems and raising sufﬁcient tax revenue they are unable (even if
willing) to affect distributional inequality to the same degree as high-income
countries.
Both components of ﬁscal self-determination, then, are signiﬁcantly corre-
lated with national income. Given the current inequality of national income we
live in a world where ﬁscal self-determination, too, is unequally distributed
among states.11
5. Fiscal self-determination and background justice
Dietsch maintains that implementing the two principles would restore ﬁscal
self-determination: it ‘guarantees international background justice in one impor-
tant way: national polities would regain the capacity to make collective ﬁscal
choices about the size of the budget and the level of domestic redistribution’
(Dietsch and Rixen 2014b, p. 177, cf. Dietsch 2015, p. 122). While there may
be other unjust constraints on the effective sovereignty of some states (e.g. in
the realm of trade or environmental policy) the implementation of the two
principles removes the harmful effects of tax competition and so guarantees
effective sovereignty in the design of ﬁscal policies. I argue in this section that
Dietsch is not entitled to draw this conclusion because he ignores the inequal-
ity of ﬁscal self-determination that exists between high and low-income
countries.
Since ﬁscal self-determination plausibly comes in degrees, it is necessary
ﬁrst to clarify the nature of international background justice by specifying how
much ﬁscal self-determination is sufﬁcient for the international order to be (in
this respect) just. Dietsch remains silent on this issue. I see two reasonable
interpretations of his position. First, Dietsch could specify that international
background justice requires equal ﬁscal self-determination, for instance the
greatest amount of ﬁscal self-determination consistent with equal ﬁscal
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self-determination for others. Call this the equality interpretation. On this inter-
pretation international background justice requires that the world consists of
independent states, not all equally afﬂuent, but recognised as equal members
of a society of states, and therefore with the right to equal ﬁscal self-determi-
nation to shape their institutions in accordance with the conception of justice
of their citizens. Secondly, Dietsch could allow for inequality but maintain that
international background justice requires a baseline of minimally effective ﬁs-
cal self-determination. Call this the baseline interpretation. On this interpreta-
tion it is necessary to establish a baseline and maintain that sufﬁcient ﬁscal
self-determination requires satisfying the baseline. This probably most closely
ﬁts Ronzoni’s account of background justice on which Dietsch relies.12
I argue that on both these interpretations the argument is invalid, since on
both interpretations it fails to show that the two principles, if implemented,
guarantee international background justice. To be sure, reversing the corrosive
effects of tax competition by means of the implementation of the two princi-
ples would allow countries to increase corporate income taxes and taxes on
capital, which could reverse some of the regressive effects of decades of tax
competition. Further, if the implementation includes country-by-country report-
ing, automatic information exchange and a ban on bank secrecy rules (as
Dietsch proposes) it is likely that (illegal) capital ﬂight from low-income coun-
tries would be signiﬁcantly curtailed. This would lead to a large increase in
absolute tax revenue for low-income countries (since their tax take is a rela-
tively small percentage of GDP to begin with). However, these effects would
be insufﬁcient to guarantee international background justice on either of the
two interpretations. The data on which Dietsch relies to claim that tax competi-
tion has affected the tax revenue of low-income countries shows a reduction of
average corporate tax revenues of low-income countries of 0.6% of GDP, from
2.6% of GDP in the early 1990s to 2.0% of GDP in the early 2000s (Keen
and Simone 2004; for a less pessimistic assessment see Keen and Mansour
2009).This effect is very modest compared to the aforementioned difference
between the total tax take of high-income OECD countries and low-income
countries (on average 35% of GDP vs. 13% of GDP). It can therefore not be
expected that curbing tax competition will bring the ﬁscal self-determination of
low-income countries even close to that of high-income countries. On the
equality interpretation, these inequalities in relative ﬁscal self-determination are
straightforwardly unjust. On the baseline interpretation these inequalities are
just only if all countries are above the baseline. A potential weakness of such
an account of background justice is that it may be impossible to establish a
non-arbitrary baseline,13 and I will for that reason not venture to construct
one.14 But I submit that on any plausible account of such a baseline many of
the poorest countries would still be left with too little ﬁscal self-determination
to meet the baseline when the pressures of tax competition have been
removed.15
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This leads me to a second, more fundamental objection. Not only will the
implementation of the two principles fail to secure international background
justice, it will fail to even improve on it in a reliable way. On the equality
interpretation, increasing international background justice requires increasing
the equality of ﬁscal self-determination. This means giving priority to increas-
ing the ﬁscal self-determination of low-income countries in order to bring them
to the level of high-income countries (possibly even at the expense of lowering
the ﬁscal self-determination of high-income countries).16 On the baseline inter-
pretation, increasing international background justice requires increasing the
number of countries that satisfy the baseline. Again this means giving priority
to increasing the ﬁscal self-determination of low-income countries, which on
any plausible account of such a baseline, fall below it.17
Neither of the two principles is appropriately sensitive to the distribution of
ﬁscal self-determination. The ﬁscal policy constraint limits the decisions of
states in designing their ﬁscal systems only to the extent that the aggregate
ﬁscal self-determination is protected. It does not protect, let alone increase, the
ﬁscal self-determination of low-income countries. To see this, take the follow-
ing example: A is a high-income country, with high ﬁscal self-determination
(a high tax-take-to-GDP ratio and high level of redistribution), in accordance
with the ﬁscal policy constraint A decides to signiﬁcantly lower its corporate
income tax rate without the intention to attract investment from abroad (e.g.
country A wishes to stimulate internal capital investment and research). This
induces a large MNC to relocate its economic activities to country A away
from low-income country B, which already has relatively low ﬁscal self-deter-
mination and is highly dependent on corporate income tax revenue. The conse-
quent loss in revenue further reduces country B’s ﬁscal self-determination. In
this example, the ﬁscal policy constraint thus protects the ﬁscal self-determina-
tion of a high-income country at the expense of the ﬁscal self-determination of
a low-income country, contrary to what international background justice
requires on either of the two suggested interpretations (assuming that country
B is below the baseline).
The principle of economic allegiance is vulnerable to a similar charge. It
allocates the tax liability of individuals and companies in accordance with
where they conduct economic activities and beneﬁt from public services and
infrastructure. This ensures, as shown above, that tax competition for account-
ing proﬁts is impossible (and when implemented together with the ﬁscal pol-
icy constraint, that any loss of ﬁscal self-determination is not due to other
countries strategically attracting FDI). However, in the face of the abovemen-
tioned inequality of ﬁscal self-determination this allocation of tax rights is
indefensible. Studies show that while FDI in low-income countries has stea-
dily increased over the last decade, many low-income countries still struggle
to attract FDI.18 This means that there cannot be a meaningful correlation
between providing access to public services and infrastructure to MNCs and
low ﬁscal self-determination. Assuming that being allocated a greater share of
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the tax base increases one’s ﬁscal self-determination, the principle of economic
allegiance does not reliably give priority to increasing the ﬁscal self-determi-
nation of low-income countries.19 For example, a MNC conducts 80% of its
economic activities in high-income country A and 20% of its activities in
low-income country B. The principle of economic allegiance then allocates
the taxable base (say, corporate income) in the same 80/20 ratio to countries
A and B, respectively. This allocation is likely to increase the inequality of
ﬁscal self-determination of the two countries, contrary to what international
background justice requires on either of the two suggested interpretations
(assuming that country B remains below the baseline).
To this line of reasoning Dietsch could respond that the objective of reform
of the international taxation regime should not be to secure international back-
ground justice tout court. Rather it should be aimed at removing the corrosive
impact of tax competition on ﬁscal self-determination alone, and so remove
one of the many causes of international background injustice. Indeed, Dietsch
suggests that the two principles are justiﬁable only ‘provided just background
global governance institutions’ (Dietsch 2015, p. 80). He has in mind institu-
tions relating to such diverse issues as ‘trade agreements on intellectual prop-
erty, the decision procedures in many international organisations, or the
negative effects of volatile capital ﬂows in response to monetary policies in the
United States and Europe’ (Dietsch 2015, pp. 204, 205). These other institu-
tions may also have a negative impact on the opportunity set of ﬁscal policies
available to a state. This means that curbing tax competition by means of the
implementation of the two principles at most removes one of the many poten-
tial obstacles to ﬁscal self-determination. However, the proposed reforms
would at least eliminate the reduction of ﬁscal self-determination due to tax
competition.
This response is not open to Dietsch. The point of the preceding argument
is not just that other factors besides tax competition lead to decreased ﬁscal
self-determination and we must therefore also correct those further causes of
international background injustice. Rather, the point is that given the concep-
tion of justice that requires either equality or the satisfaction of a baseline of
ﬁscal self-determination, the two principles do not form a reliable means to
securing justice.20 The same argument applies to the BEPS initiative. The
OECD’s aim of securing tax sovereignty – if developed into a plausible con-
ception of global justice that requires equality of tax sovereignty or the univer-
sal satisfaction of a baseline of sufﬁcient tax sovereignty – conﬂicts with the
principle of economic allegiance. The allocation of ﬁscal jurisdiction should be
sensitive to national income in a way that the principle of economic allegiance
is not. This signiﬁcantly diminishes the defensibleness of the OECD’s BEPS
initiative, as well as Dietsch more developed and reﬁned presentation of the
same approach.
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6. Regulation and redistribution
With Ronzoni, Dietsch seems to have supposed that international background
justice is an account of pure procedural justice that, unlike its domestic coun-
ter-part, does not require redistributive institutions. Ronzoni, who ﬁrst sug-
gested that tax competition might be a form of international background
injustice, writes that:
[p]lausibly … the supranational institutions that are needed to tackle tax competi-
tion will need to engage in regulatory, rather than distributive, tasks, such as
penalizing dramatic forms of tax cuts that are blatantly aimed at stealing capital
and skilled labor, or protecting weaker states from harmful tax competition
through both ﬁnancial aid and capacity-building. (Ronzoni 2009, p. 251, cf.
Ronzoni 2012, p. 585)
Dietsch echoes this when he asserts that what is needed in the face of tax com-
petition is not redistribution but ‘fair rules of the game’ (Dietsch 2015,
p. 103). He argues that if low-income countries are unable to guarantee domes-
tic distributive justice, for instance by building enough hospitals then (individ-
uals in) rich countries may have a duty of assistance towards (the individuals
in) those low-income countries. However, as he puts it, such obligations
‘should not be discharged in the form of a bias in the way the jurisdictional
structure of international taxation is set up. It should rather be dealt with via
explicit redistribution’ (Dietsch 2015, p. 102). Analogously, he might conclude
that my focus on the distribution of tax jurisdiction and concomitant tax
revenue also risks introducing an institutional bias.
I respond that Dietsch may need to take the analogy between domestic
and international background justice even more seriously.21 In the domestic
context, as Ronzoni points out, background justice requires that individuals
can interact as free and equal, which is guaranteed among other things by
redistributive institutions that ensure that market interactions do not give rise
to excessive inequalities of advantages (Rawls 2001, p. 56). My argument
shows that it is plausible that background justice in the international context,
too, requires the creation of redistributive institutions. The reason is that ﬁs-
cal self-determination, on the interpretation here developed, in part consists
in having access to sufﬁcient tax revenue (as percentage of GDP). Since it
matters, for international background justice, what is the distribution of ﬁscal
self-determination, it consequently also matters how any (potential) tax rev-
enue is distributed. The principle of economic allegiance distributes it in
accordance with where MNCs decide to locate their economic activities but
this distribution is, as noted above, not meaningfully related to the distribu-
tion of ﬁscal self-determination. The principle of economic allegiance and the
aim of securing effective tax sovereignty conﬂict, certainly in contexts where
the capacity of states to shape their ﬁscal affairs is very unequal. The point
in this case is not that low-income countries are sometimes unable to build
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sufﬁcient hospitals because they are poor, but that they are sometimes unable
to do so because they lack sufﬁcient ﬁscal self-determination. That is why
designing principles of tax justice favouring the worst-off countries does not
introduce an unjust bias (on Dietsch’s understanding of that term). On the
contrary, it would give priority to increasing the ﬁscal self-determination of
low-income countries as required by both the equality and the baseline inter-
pretation of international background justice.
Without attempting to develop a full-ﬂedged alternative to the principle of
economic allegiance, let me only suggest that given the aim of international
background justice, tax revenue gains that arise from curbing tax competition
should predominantly accrue to low-income countries (since, as established
above, GDP is correlated with ﬁscal self-determination). For instance, one
could propose a global tax authority that taxes mobile economic factors, such
as MNCs, and distributes the revenues among states in proportion to their
GDP or per capita income. The redistributive effect of such an institution
would be intended to increase the ﬁscal self-determination of the poorest coun-
tries and so increase international background justice. This would mean that
states must relinquish formal sovereignty in one domain of ﬁscal policy, which
may, or may not be compensated by increased effective sovereignty in the
form of an increased ability to determine the size of the budget and extent of
redistribution. Given that states traditionally view their ﬁscal prerogative as a
core aspect of their sovereignty, they will no doubt be very reluctant to do so
(Ring 2008, Rixen 2011, p. 457). Nevertheless, if global justice requires equal
or sufﬁcient ﬁscal self-determination, then states may have an obligation to
establish such a supranational authority whether they like it or not.
Where does this leave us? The implications of the current dynamics of the
international taxation regime may be even more far-reaching than international-
ists like Dietsch and Ronzoni have thought. Ronzoni suggests that harmful tax
competition shows the need to move beyond minimalist internationalist
accounts of global justice. Such minimalist accounts are interactional, in the
sense that they impose obligations on the actions of states such as the obliga-
tion of non-interference and a duty of assistance to burdened societies that lack
the ‘essentials of political autonomy’ (Ronzoni 2014, p. 46, referring to Rawls
1999, p. 106). The seriousness of the treat of effective sovereignty presented
by harmful tax competition, Ronzoni convincingly argues, shows that the obli-
gations of states are more substantive and may better be thought of as institu-
tional: states have obligations to establish ongoing supranational institutional
schemes constraining and regulating the actions of states (and other relevant
actors such as MNCs) so as to guarantee the effective sovereignty of states.
Ronzoni’s most developed proposal in this respect goes signiﬁcantly beyond
that of Dietsch since she recommends the establishment of a ‘global ﬁscal
authority’ that, among other things, ‘could tax those kinds of economic trans-
actions that occur transnationally, and for which identifying a territorial juris-
diction might prove impossible’ (Ronzoni 2014, p. 52). The purpose of such
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institutional arrangements, however, is not to redistribute resources but to
regulate the behaviour of states. As Ronzoni puts it, the aim is one of ‘incen-
tivising or disincentivising certain kinds of behaviour, rather than to collect
revenues in order to redistributive wealth or provide services globally’
(Ronzoni 2014, p. 52).
The argument in this paper shows that this response may still not be
sufﬁciently robust. Not only may internationalists, concerned with securing the
effective sovereignty of independent polities, be committed to the establish-
ment of supranational institutions, they may also be committed to giving these
institutions an explicitly redistributive function.22 This risks blurring the
distinction between internationalist and cosmopolitan conceptions of global
justice. Cosmopolitan conceptions generally advocate targeting global inter-
individual inequalities directly (e.g. Brock 2008). Since, as noted, global
income inequality and ﬁscal self-determination are signiﬁcantly correlated, an
internationalist too has reason to be attentive to global income inequality when
proposing institutional reforms in the realm of international taxation. While
defenders of internationalist conceptions of justice would still disagree with
cosmopolitans about the grounds for such redistribution – the former identify-
ing the unjust distribution of states’ ﬁscal self-determination and the latter the
unjust distribution of individual advantages – they could nevertheless agree
about the need to create institutions to facilitate it. Accordingly, it may be pos-
sible to establish greater consensus among political philosophers of various
stripes about the character of the reforms of the international taxation regime
needed to tackle injustices in this realm. Since theoretical consensus galvanises
political action, future work in this important and urgent debate could
explicitly aim at fostering such agreement.23
7. Conclusion
The OECD’s base erosion and proﬁt shifting initiative is an important step in
furthering the cooperation between states to tackle the harms of tax competi-
tion and the aggressive tax planning of MNCs it facilitates. But while the
OECD’s ostensible concern with effective tax sovereignty is laudable, I have
shown in this paper that the structure of proposals insufﬁciently addresses the
injustice of current inequality in effective tax sovereignty. First, I have pointed
out that, practical concerns aside, the principle of economic allegiance on its
own does not protect states in their quest for FDI from tax competition (‘real’
tax competition) that may undermine their capacity to engage in redistributive
programmes. In his recent book, Peter Dietsch can be thought to address this
concern by introducing a second principle, the ﬁscal policy constraint, that lim-
its the freedom of states to compete by lowering tax rates on the tax base that
is allocated to them by the principle of economic allegiance. Secondly, I have
shown that Dietsch’s revised proposal remains vulnerable to the charge that its
implementation would fail to reliably guarantee or even increase justice in the
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realm of ﬁscal policy. If, as Dietsch maintains, justice requires that all states
have equal or sufﬁcient ﬁscal self-determination then the international taxation
regime should be designed to promote this aim, but the principle of economic
allegiance does not reliably do so. The principle of economic allegiance (which
allocates tax jurisdiction in accordance with the economic activity of MNCs) is
non-responsive to the distribution of ﬁscal self-determination between coun-
tries. The countries where MNCs conduct economic activities are not necessar-
ily the countries that have low ﬁscal self-determination. Accordingly the
OECD’s dependence on the principle of economic allegiance is misguided.
Finally, I have shown that revised principles of tax justice, based on an interna-
tionalist conception of justice that is concerned with securing the effective
sovereignty of independent polities, may need to prescribe the creation of glob-
ally redistributive institutions. The paper accordingly suggests that it is possible
to establish a greater consensus among internationalists and cosmopolitans
about the necessary reforms of the international taxation regime.
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Notes
1. Following this literature, I use the terms ‘effective sovereignty’ (in the realm of
ﬁscal policy) and ‘ﬁscal self-determination’ interchangeably. See e.g. Dietsch
(2015, p. 170).
2. See also Dietsch and Rixen (2014b, p. 155), Ronzoni (2014, p. 43), suggests that
we may need to include a third aspect, ‘ﬂexibility – understood as the capacity to
react to new challenges or circumstances with sufﬁcient pace and discretionality’,
in order to ensure that states have the capacity to effectively respond to changes in
their economy. I take the argument in this paper to be equally applicable to that
more robust conception of ﬁscal self-determination.
3. Since, on the internationalist conception of global justice states ought to be able to
implement the conception of justice preferred by their citizens, one may object that
what matters is not so much the cardinality of the option set but rather that the
option set includes the actually preferred option. A state could have a large num-
ber of options while none of them allow the creation of just institutions, in which
case one could deny that this state has ﬁscal self-determination. I develop the car-
dinality interpretation because it is easier to operationalise and facilitates making
comparisons between states.
4. The tax take consists of government revenue minus non-tax revenue such as for-
eign aid or concessions for resource extraction.
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5. In this form the beneﬁt principle has been broadly discredited, owing to the difﬁ-
culty of measuring with any precision the beneﬁt that individuals (or companies)
derive and the arbitrariness of the pre-tax baseline. See e.g. Murphy and Nagel
2002, pp. 16–19.
6. The authors of the League of Nation report suggested the ability-to-pay principle
(Kaufman 1998, p. 197).
7. ‘For MNEs, the membership principle means that the proﬁts from an economic
activity have to be declared for tax purposes in the same jurisdiction where the
activity takes place’ (Dietsch and Rixen 2014a, p. 73, cf. Dietsch 2015, pp. 85,
107).
8. Besides proposing UT + FA, Dietsch also proposes a number of transparency
measures such as country-by-country reporting (2015, pp. 198–200) and automatic
information exchange (pp. 113, 114). Other defenders of UT + FA include
Avi-Yonah and Benshalom (2011), Avi-Yonah (2016) and Picciotto (2016).
9. Note, though, that this principle does not rule out competition on the spending side
of the government budget. For instance, it could still mean that governments in the
face of competition for the FDI choose to spend the tax revenue on goods and ser-
vices that predominantly beneﬁt MNCs. This, too, may limit governments’ ability
to redistribute and thus their ﬁscal self-determination (e.g. Sinn 2003, pp. 56–60).
10. Andreas Cassee points out to me that GDP may decrease with very high levels of
taxation (as is suggested by the Laffer curve). A revised account may say that this
component of ﬁscal self-determination consists in the cardinality of the option set
of tax-revenue-to-GDP ratios that excludes rates of taxation that reduce GDP.
11. One of the particular obstacles that low-income countries face in this respect is
recognised, albeit implicitly, by Dietsch when he compares the impact of tax com-
petition on high and low-income countries. He points out that while high-income
countries have largely been able to sustain tax revenue levels by allocating the tax
burden to less mobile economic factors, low-income countries ‘usually do not
have the administrative resources to stabilise their revenues by broadening tax
bases’ (Dietsch 2015, p. 48). I take this to mean that some ﬁscal policies were not
included in the opportunity set of these low-income countries, limiting their ﬁscal
self-determination.
12. Ronzoni (2009, p. 239), explains that in the case of contracts between individuals,
background justice can be taken to require ‘some effective freedom’ to negotiate
an agreement, which includes the enjoyment of an ‘adequate’ range of alternative
options and ‘sufﬁcient’ bargaining power. Ronzoni (2014, p. 48) speaks of the
‘conditions for the enjoyment of (a sufﬁcient level of) ﬁscal self-determination’.
However, Ronzoni (2014, p. 48), also leaves open the equality interpretation when
she writes that ‘it surely is a problem of inter-state fairness, from an international-
ist perspective, if the self-determination of some countries is structurally and sys-
temically more endangered than that of others.’
13. This is a difﬁculty that Ronzoni (2009, p. 239), escapes by claiming that her argu-
ment is ‘methodological’ rather than ‘substantive’. See also Ronzoni (2014, p. 48).
14. Except to say that a tax take below 15% of GDP is a threshold below which
countries are generally considered to ﬁnd it hard to ﬁnance even basic goods and
services (Adam and Bevan 2001, p. 12, IMF 2005, p. 47).
15. For instance, countries like Bangladesh, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of
Congo and Sudan have recently reported tax-take-to-GDP ratios well below 15%
(Le et al. 2012, pp. 33–37).
16. I bracket a number of difﬁculties including the possibility of having to ‘level
down’ and the possibility of a ‘bottomless pit’ that absolute priority to raise the
ﬁscal self-determination of low-income states might give rise to.
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17. One might object that this overlooks the possibility that all countries are beneath
the baseline. I bracket this issue since this would seem to be a sign that the base-
line is implausibly high.
18. For instance, a group of 48 so-called ‘least developed countries’ attracted just
1.9% of global FDI ﬂows in 2014 (UNCTD 2015, p. 78).
19. This is a plausible assumption especially for low-income countries that struggle to
raise sufﬁcient revenue even to provide basic services and infrastructure to their
population.
20. The argument can be extended to apply to a further issue, having to do with low-
income countries that see their ﬁscal self-determination decreased as the result of
curbing tax competition. There is evidence to suggest that some states, mostly
poor and small, stand to gain from tax competition (e.g. Genschel and Schwarz
2012). They can offset the loss of lower domestic tax revenue by the gains in rev-
enue from attracting taxable capital from abroad. (See for a discussion Rixen
2008, pp. 44, 45, Dietsch 2015, pp. 58–61.) Dietsch maintains that we must move
beyond the effective sovereignty framework in order to show that we have a ‘rea-
son of justice’ to continue to allow these low-income countries to engage in tax
competition, for instance by maintaining that ‘letting low-income countries com-
pete on taxes would get us closer to equality in the relevant dimension’ (Dietsch
2015, p. 203). In response one may point out that the framework of effective
sovereignty does give a pro-tanto reason of justice to allow small low-income
countries to engage in tax competition. Not because this will make them richer
but because their poverty is correlated with low ﬁscal self-determination and
increased tax revenue will increase their ﬁscal self-determination. Thanks to one
of the anonymous referees of this journal for pressing this issue.
21. Thanks to one of the anonymous referees for suggesting this way of putting the
response.
22. With regard to the revenues generated by her proposed global tax authority, Ronzoni
comments that they could be ‘distributed back to states according to some appropri-
ate criterion’ (Ronzoni 2014, p. 52, n. 21). The ‘appropriate criterion’ would be the
aim of securing a just distribution of ﬁscal self-determination, accomplished by dis-
tributing revenue to those countries that lack sufﬁcient ﬁscal self-determination.
23. I should perhaps emphasise that Dietsch himself has shown admirable initiative in
this regard by aiming to develop a theory of international tax justice that remains
as far as possible neutral on contested philosophical issues with regard to global
justice. (See e.g. Dietsch 2015, pp. 65, 66, for an expression of that commitment.).
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